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Abstract 
Metaphor representation theory contends that people conceptualize their non-perceptual states 
(e.g., emotion concepts) in perceptual terms. The present research extends this theory to color 
manipulations and discrete emotional representations. Two experiments (N = 265) examined 
whether a red font color would facilitate anger conceptions, consistent with metaphors referring 
to anger to “seeing red”. Evidence for an implicit anger-red association was robust and 
emotionally discrete in nature. Further, Experiment 2 examined the directionality of such 
associations and found that they were asymmetrical: Anger categorizations were faster when a 
red font color was involved, but redness categorizations were not faster when an anger-related 
word was involved. Implications for multiple literatures are discussed. 
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Anger as “Seeing Red”: 
Evidence for a Perceptual Association 
 
 Beginning with James (1884), psychologists have sought to explain feelings in terms of 
more observable phenomena, whether physiological activation patterns (Ekman, Levenson, & 
Friesen, 1983), expressive behavior (Ekman, 1992), or action tendencies (Frijda, 1992). Such 
attempts have not been entirely successful. Perhaps most to the point, the multiple components of 
emotion do not covary with each other in a manner suggesting a coordinated innate emotion 
program (Barrett, 2006; Mauss & Robinson, 2009). To understand the subjective component of 
emotions, then, it is necessary to provide an explanatory framework that does not reduce them to 
its observable manifestations (Barrett, Mequita, Ochsner, & Gross, 2007). 
 Indeed, there is an ineffability to feelings that has long been appreciated by consciousness 
scholars and researchers (Chalmers, 2007; Searle, 1998). Laypeople too, we suggest, face an 
epistemic challenge in understanding their feelings in a manner that connects them to real-world 
referents (Lambie & Marcel, 2002). The feeling of anger, for example, feels like something, but 
what exactly does it feel like? In relation to this question, Lakoff and Johnson (1980; 1999) 
contend that people think metaphorically. That is, they liken their feelings to more concrete 
perceptual experiences that provide a potentially crucial scaffolding (Williams, Huang, & Bargh, 
2009) in understanding them. According to this metaphor representation theory, for example, we 
think of nice people as “sweet” not because they taste sweet – because they most likely would 
not even if one ate them – but rather because it is similarly pleasant to interact with nice people 
and to eat sweet foods (Meier, Moeller, Riemer-Peltz, & Robinson, 2012). 
How Do People Conceptualize Their Anger States? 
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 Anger is a somewhat common feeling (Averill, 1983) and one that often leads to 
aggressive behaviors (Berkowitz, 1993). In addition, anger is disruptive to social relationships 
(Smith, Glazer, Ruiz, & Gallo, 2004) and perhaps a major scourge to social functioning more 
generally (Tavris, 1989). The manner in which individuals conceptualize their angry states is 
thus an important focus of research. We draw from metaphor representation theory (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1999) in proposing that people use perceptual metaphors to understand anger. 
 Multiple cultures associate the color red with anger and danger (Kövecses, 2000; 
Needham, 1973). Especially angry individuals are thought to “see red” or to be “red with rage” 
(Lakoff, 1987). Anger’s other metaphoric links – e.g., to heat, fire, and blood – similarly suggest 
an implicit mapping of this type (Gibbs, 1994). It is likely not arbitrary, from this perspective, 
that the Devil’s skin is red (Meier, Hauser, Robinson, Friesen, & Schjeldahl, 2007) or that 
popular movies consistently link the color red to anger and aggression (e.g., Stephen King’s 
Carrie). Such mappings may have some basis in physiology as anger often results in facial 
flushing and thus a redder face (Changizi, Zhang, & Shimojo, 2006; Drummond, 1997). On the 
basis of such considerations, we suggest, states of anger may be understood in terms of 
perceptual redness. Such considerations are revisited in the General Discussion. 
 The feeling of anger is not red as feelings have no color. Nonetheless, and on the basis of 
a largely philosophic view of metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999), we hypothesized that anger 
conceptions would borrow from the perceptual domain and do so in a manner supporting the idea 
that anger is a red emotion. If so, presenting anger words in a red font color should facilitate (i.e., 
speed) their categorization even in the context of: (a) no systematic relationship between emotion 
type and font color, and, in fact (b) instructions to ignore font color. 
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 Our predictions should be viewed in light of a tension in the emotion and emotion 
representation literatures. Ekman (1992) made a case for the idea that emotional states are 
conceptualized in a discrete manner. For example, and of particular relevance to the present 
experiments, anger and fear should differ in their correlates and biases, despite the fact that they 
are both unpleasant states of high arousal. More recently, such discrete emotion perspectives 
have been increasingly questioned, so much so that the pendulum now appears to favor 
dimensional rather than discrete perspectives on emotion (Barrett, 2006), though theorists 
contend that anger must be distinguished from other negative emotional states (Carver & 
Harmon-Jones, 2009). We sought to investigate the discreteness of the present associations and 
hypothesized that the color red would facilitate anger categorizations, but not fear or sadness 
categorizations, two other very common negative emotional states and concepts. 
The metaphor representation theory guiding our predictions (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) 
contends that conception borrows from perception, but perception does not borrow from 
conception. This asymmetry makes sense from what we know to be true concerning the temporal 
course of processing in the brain (Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, & Sergent, 2006). The 
cortices in the back of the brain are responsible for object identification processes of a 
particularly perceptual type (Storbeck, Robinson, & McCourt, 2006). Subsequently, the temporal 
and frontal cortices of the brain then attempt to assign meaning to stimuli subsequent to their 
perceptual recognition (Rolls, 1999). If so, and translated to the present context, two predictions 
can be made. First, color categorizations should be faster than emotion concept categorizations. 
Second, an asymmetry should be observed such that perceptually red stimuli should facilitate 
anger categorizations, but anger stimuli should not facilitate categorizing a font color as red. This 
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predicted asymmetry is examined in Experiment 2 in addition to its more crucial prediction that 
anger categorizations should be facilitated by a red font color. 
Experiment 1 
To the extent that anger is conceptualized in terms of the color red, presenting anger 
words in a red font color (relative to a control font color: an achromatic mid-gray) should speed 
their categorization. For purposes of discriminant validity, two word control conditions were also 
used. Some words were affectively neutral and were categorized as such. To the extent that the 
font color manipulation does not influence the speed with which neutral words can be 
categorized, such results would rule out the differential perceptibility of the two font colors. Of 
additional importance, some words were of a fear-related type and were categorized as such. On 
the basis of metaphoric associations linking the state of anger, specifically, to the color red 
(Gibbs, 1994; Lakoff, 1987), a unique and discrete relation of this type was hypothesized. 
Method 
Participants and General Procedures 
 Ninety-seven (56 female) undergraduate students from North Dakota State University 
received course credit for their participation. After general instructions, participants completed 
the emotion categorization task on a personal computer. 
Emotion Categorization Task 
 Participants were instructed to categorize presented words as quickly and accurately as 
possible within an e-Prime program. They were also told that the words might vary in font color 
from trial to trial, but that such variations were irrelevant to the task at hand. Against a white 
background, words were randomly assigned to red versus mid-gray font colors in a 24-point font 
size. Gray was chosen as a control condition because it was non-chromatic in nature, yet clearly 
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discernible against the background. By importing e-Prime’s default red and mid-gray colors into 
Adobe Photoshop software, we were able to confirm that the two font colors used corresponded 
to the hues characteristic of red (CIE angle 0) and gray (which has no CIE angle because it has 
no hue) and were practically equivalent in brightness values. There were 120 trials in the task. 
 Word stimuli were to be categorized as anger-related, fear-related, or neutral. Anger and 
fear words were chosen on the basis of markers from the PANAS-X (Watson & Clark, 1994), a 
well-validated self-report inventory of emotion, and on the basis of additional categorization 
norms from our lab (e.g., Wilkowski & Robinson, 2007). Neutral words were chosen such that 
they were neither unpleasant nor pleasant according to the word norms of Bradley and Lang 
(1999). Particularly in relation to the anger and fear words, it was deemed important to use only 
highly prototypical, representative stimuli, as the use of less prototypical stimuli (e.g., the word 
“contempt” for anger) would undermine accuracy rates, which we wanted to be high. 
 On the basis of such considerations, we presented 10 anger word stimuli (angry, annoyed, 
bitter, furious, hostile, infuriated, irritable, mad, outraged, & scornful), 10 fear word stimuli 
(afraid, fearful, frightened, jittery, jumpy, nervous, panicky, scared, shaky, & worried), and 10 
neutral stimuli (author, chart, custom, dense, exposure, garment, proof, swallow, vertical, & 
violin). Word frequencies (based on the norms of Kucera & Francis, 1967) were equal for the 
three word categories, F (2, 18) = .03, p = .97, as were the number of letters for the three word 
categories, F (2, 18) = .16, p = .85. Admittedly, the neutral stimuli were largely nouns, whereas 
the emotional stimuli were all adjectives. However, our predictions were of an interactive (word 
category x font color) type rather than of a main effect (word category) type. Words were 
repeated four times each. 
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 Word stimuli were randomly assigned to trial number and randomly assigned to one of 
the two font colors – red or gray. Such random assignment algorithms were different for each 
participant, as was true in Experiment 2 as well. Such random assignment algorithms also 
ensured that the same word stimulus was sometimes paired with one color and sometimes with 
the other across repetitions of the words, even for a particular participant, and this was also true 
in Experiment 2 as well. Responses were made using the arrow keys of the right, lower portion 
of the keyboard. Participants were instructed to place their right index fingers on the down arrow 
key at the start of each trial, which did not begin until they had done so. Thereafter, the trial 
stimulus was presented at center screen. If the stimulus was perceived to be neutral, participants 
were to press the up arrow key immediately above the down arrow key. Anger and fear words 
were categorized using the left and right response arrows of this portion of the keyboard, with 
these mappings counterbalanced across participants. Erroneous responses were penalized by a 
1000 ms “INCORRECT” error message. 
Results 
Results Involving Categorization Speed 
 Reaction times (RTs) were handled in accordance with recommendations in the literature. 
Inaccurate responses (M = 9.84%) were deleted, RTs were log-transformed, and log-transformed 
times 2.5 SDs below or above the grand latency mean were replaced with these values 
(Robinson, 2007). A 3 (Word Type) x 2 (Font Color) repeated measures ANOVA was then 
conducted on the (trimmed) log latency means, though millisecond means will be reported for 
ease of interpretation. 
 There was a main effect for Word Type, F (1, 95) = 80.72, p < .01, partial eta square = 
.46. Neutral words were categorized faster (M = 983 ms) than anger- (M = 1128 ms) or fear-
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related (M = 1168 ms) words. This main effect is not important in the present context, but we 
offer a brief interpretation of it. Studies have shown that a first stage in affective processing 
seems to involve whether stimuli are of an affective type or not (e.g., Murphy & Zajonc, 1993). 
Only with subsequent processing are discrete forms of negative affect likely distinguished 
(Barrett, 2006). Accordingly, the slower RTs exhibited in the negative affect conditions, relative 
to the neutral condition, likely involves the added processing time necessary to disambiguate the 
two types of negative stimuli. 
 Interestingly, it was also found that anger stimuli were categorized faster than fear 
stimuli, F (1, 95) = 9.84, p < .01, partial eta square = .09, despite the fact that such stimuli were 
equal in word frequency, number of letters, and all were adjectives. We are not aware of any 
precedent for this finding, but it may comport with other results showing that words suggesting a 
more palpable threat to the self, as should be the case for anger relative to fear stimuli (Wentura, 
Rothermund, & Bak, 2000), are recognized faster (Wurm & Vakoch, 2000). On the other hand, 
there was no main effect for Font Color, F (1, 95) = 1.51, p = .22. Thus, the two color conditions 
were well-matched in terms of their discriminability against the background. 
Of most importance was the hypothesized Word Type by Font Color interaction, which 
was significant, F (1, 95) = 9.40, p < .01, partial eta square = .09. Millisecond means for this 
interaction are displayed in Figure 1. The means reported in Figure 1 suggest that a red font color 
facilitated the categorization of anger words, but not neutral or fear words. This impression was 
confirmed by follow-up tests examining the effect of the font color manipulation for each word 
type separately. Anger categorizations were faster when the font color was red rather than gray, 
F (1, 95) = 17.12, p < .01, partial eta square = .15. On the other hand, the font color manipulation 
was a non-significant predictor of the speed with which words could be categorized as neutral, F 
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(1, 95) = .01, p = .91, or fear-related, F (1, 95) = 2.95, p = .09. We are reluctant to make much of 
the latter marginal effect given the substantial power of the experiment. In any case, the fact that 
fear categorizations were slightly faster when stimuli were gray rather than red reinforces the 
specificity of the anger-redness association. 
Results Involving Accuracy Rates 
 The task, stimuli, and procedures were designed to ensure high accuracy rates. 
Nonetheless, it might be important to examine accuracy rates in relation to potential speed-
accuracy tradeoffs (Pashler, 1998). Accordingly, a 3 (Word Type) x 2 (Font Color) ANOVA was 
conducted to examine accuracy rates as a function of the manipulations. The Word Type 
manipulation was again significant, indicating that neutral words could be more easily 
categorized (Ms = 95.51%, 91.91%, & 90.77% for neutral, anger, & fear words, respectively). 
There was no main effect for Font Color, F (1, 95) = .00, p = .96, but there was a Word Type by 
Font Color interaction, F (1, 95) = 4.14, p = .05, partial eta square = .12. 
 To understand the latter interaction, follow-up ANOVAs were performed. The font color 
manipulation was irrelevant in predicting the accuracy of neutral word categorizations, F (1, 95) 
= .88, p = .35. On the other hand, anger categorizations were directionally, though not 
significantly, more accurate when the font color was red (M = 92.63%) rather than gray (M = 
91.20%), F (1, 95) = 2.45, p = .12. Fear categorizations, by contrast, were directionally, though 
not significantly, more accurate when the font color was gray (M = 91.49%) rather than red (M = 
90.05%), F (1, 95) = 3.41, p = .07. In relation to accuracy data, which were not of central 
interest, the most important point is that there was no hint of a speed-accuracy tradeoff for anger 
words presented in a red font color. 
Discussion 
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 Experiment 1 examined the novel idea that people implicitly conceptualize anger in terms 
of perceptual redness. If so, an irrelevant manipulation of perceptual redness should facilitate 
anger categorizations, discretely so. Just such a pattern was observed, it was unique to anger 
words relative to fear or neutral words, and it was not associated with a speed-accuracy tradeoff. 
Given the novelty of these results, it was deemed important to conceptually replicate them. 
Experiment 2 
 Experiment 1 had included a neutral word categorization condition, which was viewed as 
an important control condition in this initial experiment. As hypothesized, the font color 
manipulation was quite irrelevant to the speed with which neutral words could be categorized. 
Accordingly, we dropped the neutral word condition in Experiment 2. A benefit of doing so is 
that two-alternative choice tasks are more common to the social cognition literature (Fazio & 
Olson, 2003; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000) and the processes contributing to performance in 
them are better understood than are choice tasks with more than two response options (Luce, 
1959; Meyer, Irwin, Osman, & Kounois, 1988). 
Additionally, Experiment 1 provided important support for a discrete emotions 
perspective favoring the implicit association of anger and perceptual redness. In Experiment 2, 
we sought to provide additional support for this perspective. We did so by asking individuals to 
categorize emotional stimuli as anger- or sadness-related. Sadness, like fear, is a common and 
basic negative emotion, nonetheless thought to differ from anger in terms of its correlates 
(Ekman, 1992). Further support for a discrete emotions perspective would thus be found to the 
extent that a red font color facilitates anger word, but not sadness word, categorizations. As a 
color control condition, Experiment 1 used an achromatic gray. To rule out the possibility that 
the findings of Experiment 1 were due to the presence of color per se, regardless of that color, 
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Experiment 2 presented anger and sadness words in either red or blue font colors. Blue is as 
basic a color as red and there is a unique set of retinal cones sensitive to blue wavelengths 
(Goldstein, 1999). 
 A secondary question of Experiment 2 was whether sadness categorizations would be 
facilitated by a blue (relative to a red) font color. In favor of this possibility is the fact that “blue” 
is often used as a synonym for sadness. Disfavoring such an association are two considerations. 
First, cultures agree on the affective connotations of the colors white, black, and red to a far 
greater extent than they agree on the affective connotations of other colors such as blue, green, or 
yellow (Lakoff, 1987; Needham, 1973). Second, metaphoric associations are likely reinforced by 
repeated perception-conception pairings (Kövecses, 2000). Although it is easy to see how prior 
experiences gave rise to the idea that anger is red, it is difficult to discern systematic reasons for 
sadness being blue. For example, although angry others may exhibit facial flushing, sad others 
are not likely to have a blue skin tone. In addition, it is quite unlikely that people are sadder on 
days on which clear blue skies predominate. In point of fact, then, we were uncertain as to 
whether a sadness-blue association would be found in Experiment 2. 
 A final question of interest in Experiment 2 was the idea of Lakoff and Johnson (1999) 
that metaphoric associations should be asymmetric in that conception is thought to borrow from 
perception, but not vice versa. The brain, in fact, is structured such that perception precedes 
conception (Dehaene et al., 2006; Rolls, 1999) and therefore such asymmetric predictions make 
sense. In two sub-experiments, we presented the same stimuli – anger and sadness words 
presented in a red or blue font color – to all participants, but either in the context of a conceptual 
(i.e., anger versus sadness) or perceptual (i.e., red versus blue font color) categorization task. In 
comparing the results of these sub-experiments, we hypothesized a three-way interaction of an 
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asymmetric type: Anger words should be categorized faster when presented in a red font color, 
but red font categorizations should not be facilitated when the relevant word is an anger-related 
one. Further discussion of such interactive predictions is presented following the relevant results. 
Method 
Participants and General Procedures 
 Data were collected in two successive weeks. During the first week of data collection, 88 
participants (33 female) were asked to categorize (red or blue) stimuli as anger- or sadness-
related. During the second week of data collection, 80 participants (35 female) were asked to 
categorize (anger- or sadness-related) stimuli as red or blue in font color. All participants were 
from North Dakota State University and all received course credit by their participation. 
 Participants were not randomly assigned to the two categorization tasks, as we had 
initially considered these to be two separate experiments, albeit of a largely overlapping nature. 
On the other hand, our participant pool is practically identical from week to week in age, race, 
sex, and personality characteristics. Accordingly, and given a subset of the theoretical goals 
mentioned above, we combined the two data sets for present purposes. General procedures for 
the two sub-experiments were identical to those of Experiment 1. 
Categorization Tasks 
 Whether categorizing stimuli by emotion or font color, the same instructions were 
administered. Participants were to categorize presented stimuli as quickly and accurately as 
possible. In the case of both tasks, the stimuli were the same. There were six anger-related words 
(anger, furious, irate, outrage, scornful, & violent) and six sadness-related words (depressed, 
gloomy, lonely, miserable, sad, & sorrowful), chosen on the basis of the prototype analysis of 
Storm and Storm (1987). Anger and sadness words were equal in word frequency, F (1, 5) = .00, 
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p = .97 and number of letters, F (1, 5) = .00, p = 1.00. Words were repeated multiple times to 
produce the desired number of trials. 
 Both tasks were programmed in e-Prime using the default red and blue font color options 
of the program and a mid-gray background was used. By importing stimuli into Adobe 
Photoshop software, we were able to confirm that the two font colors were prototypically red 
(CIE angle 0) and blue (CIE angle 240) and were equal in luminance (brightness) values. Stimuli 
were identical in size (18-point), were centrally displayed, response mappings were provided, a 
response box was used, and individuals were penalized with a 1500 ms visual error message in 
the case of inaccurate categorizations. A 150 ms blank interval followed each response and the 
presentation of the next stimulus to be categorized. 
 In the emotion-categorization task, words were categorized as anger- or sadness-related. 
In the color-categorization task, words were categorized in terms of whether they were red or 
blue in font color. In both tasks, responses were made using both index fingers by pressing the 1 
or 5 keys of a response box, with response mappings counterbalanced across participants. Word 
stimuli and font colors were randomly assigned to trial number for both tasks. The number of 
trials involved did differ slightly across the tasks (192 for the emotion categorization task & 120 
for the color categorization task), a design difference further considered in the Results section. 
Results 
Results Involving Categorization Speed 
 Reaction times were handled in a manner identical to Experiment 1, but separately so for 
the two tasks involved. Following such RT transformation procedures, response latencies were 
examined as a function of the 2 (Task: emotion categorizations versus font color categorizations) 
x 2 (Word Type: anger versus sadness) x 2 (Font Color: red versus blue) mixed-model design. It 
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was hypothesized that font color categorizations would be faster than emotion categorizations 
and this was the case, as revealed by a main effect for Task, F (1, 166) = 433.05 p < .01, partial 
eta square = .72 (Ms = 463 ms & 809 ms, respectively). Thus, it was easier to categorize the 
same stimuli in perceptual rather than connotative terms, a result that comports with brain-based 
models of the time course of perceptual versus conceptual achievements (Rolls, 1999). 
 Main effects for Word Type, F (1, 166) = .71, p = .40, and Font Color, F (1, 166) = .18, p 
= .67, were not significant, nor were the Word Type by Font Color, F (1, 166) = 1.20, p = .27, 
the Task by Word Type, F (1, 166) = .20, p = .65, or the Task by Font Color, F (1, 166) = 1.00, p 
= .32, two-way interactions significant. What is particularly emphasized is that the implicit 
association of anger and perceptual redness (which would have involved a Word Type by Font 
Color interaction) was not robust across the two tasks. Instead, and as hypothesized, there was a 
significant Task by Word Type by Font Color interaction, F (1, 166) = 10.53, p < .01, partial eta 
square = .06. 
 To better understand the nature of the three-way interaction observed in Experiment 2, 2 
(Word Type) x 2 (Font Color) repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted for each task 
separately considered. In the emotion categorization task, main effects for Word Type, F (1, 87) 
= .62, p = .43, and Font Color, F (1, 87) = 1.11, p = .30, were not significant. The latter non-
significant main effect establishes that the two colors manipulated were equally discernable. As 
hypothesized, however, there was a significant Word Type by Font Color interaction, F (1, 87) = 
8.23, p < .01, partial eta square = .09. Means for this interaction are displayed in Figure 2. 
Follow-up pairwise comparisons established that anger categorizations were faster when the font 
color was red rather than blue, F (1, 87) = 7.25, p < .01, partial eta square = .08, but that font 
color did not have an impact on sadness categorization times, F (1, 87) = 1.04, p = .31.  
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 In the follow-up ANOVA involving performance speed in the color categorization task, 
main effects for Word Type, F (1, 79) = .14, p = .71, and Font Color, F (1, 79) = .15, p = .70, 
were not significant. There was a marginal interaction of these two factors, F (1, 79) = 2.84, p = 
.10, but the pattern was very different than that found in the emotion categorization task. Indeed, 
when categorizing colors, there was some tendency for individuals to be slower to categorize 
stimuli as red in font color when the words were anger-related (M = 468 ms) rather than sadness-
related (M = 457 ms) – a marginal interference effect rather than a facilitation effect. Means were 
463 ms and 465 ms for the two remaining cells of the interaction – namely, sadness words 
presented in red and blue colors, respectively. 
 Recall that there were more trials in the emotion categorization task than in the perceptual 
categorization task. A supplemental analysis was thus performed in which task lengths were 
equated by using only the first 120 trials of the emotion categorization task. Again, there was a 
main effect for Task, F (1, 166) = 430.32, p < .01, partial eta square = .72, and the hypothesized 
three-way interaction remained significant, F (1, 166) = 9.22, p < .01, partial eta square = .05. 
Effects in the perceptual categorization task, which involved 120 trials, were necessarily the 
same as those reported above. In the emotion categorization task, main effects for Word Type, F 
(1, 87) = .13, p = .72, and Font Color, F (1, 87) = .68, p = .41, were not significant, but there was 
a significant Word Type by Font Color interaction, F (1, 87) = 6.71, p < .01, partial eta square = 
.07. Anger categorization times were faster when stimuli were red rather than blue, F (1, 87) = 
5.72, p < .01, partial eta square = .06, but sadness categorization times did not vary by font color, 
F (1, 87) = 1.68, p = .20. 
Results Involving Accuracy Rates 
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 A parallel 2 (Task) x 2 (Word Type) x 2 (Font Color) ANOVA was conducted on 
accuracy rates. Because the tasks were designed to be sensitive to RT rather than accuracy, and 
because our primary interest in examining accuracy rates was to rule out potential speed-
accuracy tradeoffs, lower-order effects are not reported. Of most importance, there was a 
significant Task by Word Type by Font Color interaction, F (1, 166) = 5.45, p = .02, partial eta 
square = .05. As in the case of reaction time tendencies, this three-way interaction was 
decomposed by performing repeated measures ANOVAs for each task condition separately 
considered. 
 In the emotion categorization task, there was a significant Word Type by Font Color 
interaction, F (1, 87) = 13.81, p < .01, partial eta square = .03. Anger categorizations were more 
accurate when the font color was red (M = 94.78%) rather than blue (M = 93.66%), F (1, 87) = 
4.95, p = .03, partial eta square = .05, but sadness categorizations were more accurate when the 
font color was blue (M = 95.40%) rather than red (M = 93.87%), F (1, 87) = 11.75, p < .01, 
partial eta square = .12. Such results further reinforce the idea that anger and perceptual redness 
are implicitly associated, though they do suggest some association of sadness and perceptual 
blueness, a result further discussed below. In the color categorization task, by contrast, the Word 
Type by Font Type interaction was not significant, F (1, 87) = .02, p = .88. 
Discussion 
 As in Experiment 1, anger categorizations were facilitated when such words were 
presented in a red font color. This implicit tendency to conceptualize anger in terms of perceptual 
redness appears to be a robust one as it was found across two different emotion concept control 
conditions (fear in Experiment 1 & sadness in Experiment 2) and two different font color control 
conditions (gray in Experiment 1 & blue in Experiment 2). Moreover, accuracy rates tended to 
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confirm an implicit anger-redness association rather than suggest a speed-accuracy tradeoff. This 
was especially the case in Experiment 2. 
 By contrast, our introduction to Experiment 2 should have made it clear that we were less 
certain as to whether a blue font color would facilitate sadness categorizations. Although “blue” 
is a synonym for sadness in the English language, we also presented reasons for doubting the 
generality of such implicit associations. In point of fact, the evidence for a sadness-blue mapping 
was mixed: Although reaction times did not favor such an association, accuracy rates did so. 
Further research on the possibility that sadness and the color blue are linked, then, can be 
advocated. In any case, all of our results are consistent with the idea that perceptual redness 
facilitates anger categorizations, the central hypothesis of our investigation. 
 Turning to a different purpose of Experiment 2, metaphoric associations are thought to be 
asymmetric in that conceptual representations borrow from perceptual representations but not 
vice versa (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). Experiment 2 included a relatively direct test of this idea. 
Using the same stimuli in both conceptual and perceptual categorization tasks, it was found that 
anger categorizations were facilitated by a red font color, but categorizations of perceptual 
redness were not faster in the context of anger words. There are at least two ways of viewing 
such asymmetric effects and they seem compatible to us. From a metaphor representation 
perspective, abstract feeling states are to be explained, not perceptual experiences (Meier & 
Robinson, 2005). From a brain-based view, perception precedes conception and thus it is far 
more likely for perceptions to influence conceptions than vice versa (Dehaene et al., 2006; Rolls, 
1999). Both such views assume that perception is the easier achievement and we found support 
for this idea in that the same stimuli were classified as red or blue much more quickly than they 
were emotionally categorized. In other words, it is perhaps precisely because color 
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categorizations are easier than emotion categorizations that we observed the asymmetric effects 
that we did. More difficult perceptual tasks might reveal that anger stimuli facilitate redness 
categorizations and we encourage this direction of future research, though such difficult 
perceptual tasks would seem somewhat unnatural to the perceptual environment. 
General Discussion 
 Linguistically, people often refer to anger in terms of perceptual redness (e.g., “seeing 
red”). We pursued the idea that such linguistic expressions capture an important truth. Namely, 
they capture a deep mapping in which perceptual redness is recruited in understanding and 
conceptualizing anger even in the absence of a communication context. Specifically, we 
hypothesized that perceptually red stimuli would facilitate anger categorizations. This predicted 
effect was confirmed in two experiments involving two color control conditions (gray & blue) 
and two negative emotion control conditions (fear & sadness). In the General Discussion, we 
focus on theoretical considerations, potential reasons why anger and perceptual redness are 
linked, task considerations, and also highlight some brief directions for future research. 
Theoretical Considerations 
 It is important to mention that metaphor representation theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) 
is just that – a theory. Good theories account for important facts and make specific predictions. 
The metaphor representation theory fulfills such criteria. People very frequently think and talk 
about their experiences in metaphoric terms (Kövecses, 2000). Just how frequently they do so 
can be appreciated by noting that “closeness” is a surprisingly common way of conceptualizing 
and referring to intimate relationships (Williams & Bargh, 2008), that references to “seeing” are 
surprisingly common when people seek to characterize experiences of insight and understanding 
(Lakoff, 1987), and that the containment metaphor of “in” is remarkable for its extended use in 
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referring to states and relationship commitments that are not themselves based on any sort of 
containment within a physical space (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). 
 An admirable feature of metaphor representation theory, further, is that it makes specific 
predictions: To the extent that linguistic metaphors are consistent (e.g., dominance being “up”, 
nice people being “sweet”, and so on), specific and novel predictions can be made. For example, 
Meier et al. (2012) were able to show that nice individuals, as defined in terms of the personality 
trait of agreeableness, actually did like sweet foods (e.g., chocolate cake) to a greater extent, but 
did not like spicy, sour, bitter, or salty foods to a greater extent. The metaphor linking niceness to 
sweetness, then, proved to be highly informative in generating novel empirical results. The 
present results should be viewed as supportive of a link between anger and perceptual redness 
that (a) is consistent with common linguistic metaphors, (b) had not been previously 
investigated, and yet (c) does not “prove” the theory that we drew from. 
 On the other hand, as findings consistent with this theory accumulate, the theory should 
be accorded more weight in future studies of affective processing and social functioning. In fact, 
predictions derived from metaphor representation theory (or related theories) have been 
supported in studies linking positive affect to perceptual lightness (Meier, Robinson, & Clore, 
2004), dominance to higher vertical positions (Schubert, 2005), intimacy and perspective taking 
to perceptual closeness (Williams & Bargh, 2008), and morality to cleanliness (Zhong & 
Liljenquist, 2006). It is unlikely that such diverse results can simply be due to covariations in 
past experience, at least in a simplistic manner. For example, many very positive experiences 
(e.g., love-making or partying) occur after nightfall, a period of darkness. Such issues, though, 
should be discussed in a more nuanced manner, which we do next. 
Why are Anger and Perceptual Redness Linked? 
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 Of all the emotions, anger is quite likely the one that best predicts behaviors intended to 
physically harm another person (Berkowitz, 1993). Anger is thus an especially dangerous 
interpersonal emotion (Tavris, 1989). Perceptual redness signals danger in several contexts. 
Toxic plants and animals are often red-colored in nature. A particularly injurious portion of fire 
is red or orange in its coloration. Harmed individuals bleed and blood is red when it exits the 
body. It is not likely a coincidence, then, that red is used to signal danger in more symbolic 
contexts – such as red stop signs, stop lights, or fire trucks (Elliot & Maier, 2007). It is equally 
understandable, from this perspective, why anger metaphors frequently reference redness (e.g., 
“seeing red”), why red is viewed as angry in many cultures (Needham, 1973), and why the 
present experimental results involving anger categorizations were so robust in nature. 
 In addition, though, anger and redness might be linked for physiological reasons. Anger 
often produces facial flushing, which renders faces perceptually redder (Changizi et al., 2006; 
Drummond, 1997). On the other hand, facial flushing also occurs in non-angry states such as 
sexual excitement (Katchadourian, 1987). Perhaps, then, states considered passionate, a quality 
of both anger and sexual excitement, co-opt perceptual redness and this association has a 
possible physiological (and observable) origin. Regardless, our results supported a discrete 
perspective of the relevant results in that a red font color facilitated anger categorizations, but did 
not facilitate fear categorizations, though both states are negative/high arousal ones. 
Task Considerations 
 The results should be viewed as quite distinct from emotional Stroop effects (for a 
review, see Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). In an emotional Stroop task, emotional 
words (most typically threatening words) are presented in different font colors and the task is to 
name the font colors while ignoring the words. It is often observed that anxious individuals 
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exhibit slower color-naming performance when the words to be ignored are threatening in nature 
relative to non-threatening, a result that is not typically observed among non-anxious individuals 
(MacLeod, 1999). Our participants, however, were required to categorize emotional words, not 
name font colors. In addition, response facilitation rather than slowed reaction times were 
observed. Finally, results were specific to a given font color – red – that is metaphorically linked 
to anger, and were therefore not of the sort shown in emotional Stroop tasks, in which the actual 
font color is quite irrelevant to predictions (Williams et al., 1996). For all of these reasons, we 
suggest that emotional Stroop processes and findings are irrelevant to our results. 
 Similarly, our results are quite different from those reported in the color-word Stroop 
literature (see MacLeod, 1991, for a review). The Stroop effect is one in which individuals are 
slower to name font colors when the printed word in question is incongruent rather than 
congruent with the font color involved. By contrast, our participants were required to categorize 
emotional words, not to name font colors. In addition, our task did not manipulate response 
congruencies or incongruencies (MacLeod, 1991) in that font colors were irrelevant to the 
emotional categorizations to be made. Although Stroop-related facilitation effects have been 
observed, none of the relevant mechanisms proposed – inadvertent reading processes (Kane & 
Engle, 2003), convergence of sources of information (Melara & Algom, 2003), or lexicality costs 
(Brown, Gore, & Carr, 2002) can be viewed as relevant to our results. We manipulated font 
colors and reading processes are thus irrelevant. Convergence is defined in terms of a very direct 
overlap between irrelevant and relevant sources of information (e.g., the word red in a red font 
color) and our tasks did not involve such direct sources of overlap. Finally, the to-be-ignored 
source of information (font color) was not lexical and our results cannot therefore be understood 
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in terms of lexical processing costs. In sum, although our tasks involved font colors and words, 
results cannot be ascribed to emotional or color-word Stroop-like processes (De Houwer, 2003). 
 Our designs were within-subject designs, common to the cognition and affective 
processing literatures. The benefits of within-subject designs are several and we mention a 
particularly important one here. Within-subject designs control for individual differences in 
overall speed, which can be pronounced (Robinson & Oishi, 2006) and therefore a source of 
unwanted and uncontrolled noise. As to whether within-subject designs somehow reinforce 
associations of the present type, we do not think so. The fact is that word/color pairings were 
made on a randomized basis and there was thus no systematic relation between a particular 
emotion category (e.g., anger) and a particular perceptual color (e.g., red). It remains to be seen 
whether similar results might be found when manipulating color in a between-subjects manner, 
however, and this future direction of research might be advocated in examining boundary 
conditions. 
Future Research Directions 
 We conclude by mentioning some directions for future research, albeit briefly so. It 
would be useful to examine whether the locus of our effects is more perception- or response-
related, which can be done using electrophysiological measures and suitable paradigms (Luck, 
2005). Although Lakoff (1986) suggested that metaphoric associations within a given culture are 
likely to be somewhat universal, we have found that such metaphoric effects vary by individuals 
in an informative manner (e.g., Meier & Robinson, 2006; Robinson, Zabelina, Ode, & Moeller, 
2008). It would thus seem useful to determine whether individual differences in the magnitude of 
red-anger facilitation effects observed can be used to understand and predict individual 
differences in anger. A final direction of research follows from the work of Elliot and colleagues 
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(e.g., Elliot & Maier, 2007). It would be informative to the social psychology literature to 
determine whether perceptual redness cues result in higher levels of anger, social judgments 
related to anger, or aggression. We view individuals, as do Gibbs (1994) and Lakoff and Johnson 
(1999), as subtly yet profoundly trapped by their conceptual metaphors. If so, manipulations of 
perceptual redness are likely to influence anger-related judgments and outcomes beyond those 
found in the present investigation. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Emotion Categorization Speed as a Function of Font Color, Experiment 1 
Figure 2. Emotion Categorization Speed as a Function of Font Color, Experiment 2 
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